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Cotton subsidies have received considerable attention dur-
ing the past four years, primarily triggered by the excessive
government support received by the cotton sectors in the
United States and the European Union. In response to that
support, four cotton-producing countries in West and Central
Africa—Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad—have request-
ed that the Doha round of negotiations on trade liberalization
contain financial compensation for WCA countries for as long
as those Western subsidies remain in place. Brazil also brought
a case to the World Trade Organization, claiming that the U.S.
subsidies cause a reduction in the world prices of cotton, thus
reducing the income of Brazilian cotton growers. 
Western cotton subsidies should be abolished, but not
much attention has been paid to another, perhaps more
important, issue. Many African cotton-producing countries,
especially in WCA, must reform their cotton sector in order
to allow a greater share of the world price to reach the grow-
ers and must foster a policy environment that is conducive to
the promotion of new technologies. For the most part, the
cotton sectors of the WCA countries are managed by govern-
ment-owned parastatals. Competition by private entities is
limited—with deleterious consequences for the efficiency of
the cotton sectors.
Basic Facts about the WCA Cotton Sectors
Cotton is the dominant cash crop in most of West and
Central Africa, with respective cotton sectors sharing a num-
ber of similarities. The industries were pioneered during the
1960s and 1970s by the French state-owned company
Compagnie Française de Développement des Fibres Textiles
(CFDT)1 in conjunction with national state-owned cotton
companies. Those state-owned companies had a legally pro-
tected monopsony in cotton buying, and most also had a
monopoly on primary processing, marketing, and supplying
of inputs.2
Typically, the state-owned companies would announce a
base buying price before farmers planted their cotton, some-
times supplementing that price with a second payment
(payable in the following season as a bonus) based on those
companies’ financial health. Most cotton used to be market-
ed through Compagnie Cotonnière (COPACO), a CFDT sub-
sidiary. The cotton industries also benefited from research
carried out by the French Agricultural Research Institute or
Centre de Cooperation Internationale en Recherche
Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD).
The performance of the WCA cotton industries has been
described as a success story.3 Indeed, between 1970 and
1988 WCA cotton yields per hectare grew at 6.1 percent per
annum, which compared to 1.9 percent annual growth in
world cotton yields per hectare and implied that, had trends
continued, WCA yields would have been similar to world
yields by the early 1990s.4 Moreover, between 1970 and
2005, cotton production in WCA increased tenfold, from a
little over 100,000 tons in 1970 to one million tons in 2005.
The sector’s contribution to total merchandise exports in the
WCA countries ranges from 25 to 45 percent, while its con-
tribution to GDP ranges from 3 to 6 percent. Moreover, the
cotton sector provides income to one million households in
the region.
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Yet, the seemingly successful performance of the indus-
tries masked a number of weaknesses that called into ques-
tion their long-term sustainability or even their survival.
First, the post-1980 production increases reflect solely
expansion of the area under cultivation. In contrast, the pre-
1980 production increases reflected yield increases per
hectare, mainly in response to fertilizer use. A growth
decomposition analysis for the 1980–2005 period shows that
cotton yields in WCA countries remained stagnant. That
compares unfavorably with the 1.7 percent annual growth
rate of global cotton output, which is a reflection of yield
increases only.
Second, growers in WCA countries received low prices
even when word prices were high. For example, during the
early 1980s, WCA cotton producers were receiving between
60 and 70 Communauté financière d’Afrique franc (CFAf)
per kilogram for their seed cotton, while the world price of
cotton ranged between the equivalent of 200 and 250 CFAf.5
Similarly, following the 1994 devaluation of the CFAf, pro-
ducer prices paid by the cotton companies were adjusted
upwards, but far less than the increase in world price, thus
denying WCA cotton growers the high prices enjoyed by
cotton producers elsewhere. Furthermore, econometric evi-
dence shows that in none of the WCA countries did the pric-
ing mechanism reflect movements in the world price of cot-
ton.6 In other words, the price-setting mechanisms have
entirely ignored world market signals in all WCA countries.
That is ironic, considering that the various price formulas
used to determine the price to be paid to WCA cotton grow-
ers use as their starting point the world price of cotton.
Third, while the panterritorial pricing mechanism (i.e.,
prices being the same in the entire country) common to all
WCA countries is a convenient and socially popular income
redistribution mechanism, in effect it transfers resources
from efficient cotton growers (or growers with transportation
and/or location advantages) to less efficient ones. Price con-
trols within each country have thus constrained overall
growth and innovation in the industry by penalizing the most
productive entities (or areas) of the sector.
Fourth, in periods of price declines most cotton compa-
nies experienced financial difficulties, which in turn led to
demands for fiscal transfers from state budgets, thus putting
into jeopardy the fiscal position of those countries. For
example, during the late 1990s the state-owned cotton com-
pany of Mali was in no position to manage the downturn in
cotton prices, because the stabilization fund, created to set
aside a portion of profits from earlier periods of high prices,
turned out to be empty, resulting in financial losses of CFAf
56 billion ($100 million) to the cotton company. Eventually,
the cotton company was bailed out by the government
through budgetary support. Similar bailouts took place in
most WCA countries following the two cotton price collaps-
es—in the mid-1980s, and in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Fifth, because of their inefficient and inflexible structure,
the cotton companies were not sufficiently prepared (in
terms of improved sales strategies, risk management tools,
and adoption of new technologies) to respond to the chang-
ing nature of the external environment, especially the down-
ward trend and volatile nature of world prices. Those price
changes reflected technological changes, as well as, to some
extent, subsidies by some developed countries (especially the
United States and the European Union).7 For example, more
than one third of global cotton output is now of genetically
modified origin. Furthermore, China and India, two develop-
ing countries with high rates of adoption of genetically mod-
ified cotton have experienced considerable yield gains. Yet,
with the exception of Burkina Faso, none of the WCA coun-
tries has allowed even field trials of genetically modified cot-
ton to assess the likely risks and benefits of such technology.
That is unfortunate, because recent research has shown that
the benefits of fully utilizing biotechnology may be even
higher than the benefits from the elimination of all cotton
trade distortions.8
Finally, the CFAf is fixed against the euro (or the French
franc, FF, prior to 1999). The CFAf exchange rate has been
subjected to only one adjustment since 1948—from CFAf 50
to CFAf 100 per FF in 1994. That fixed exchange rate has
often led to unintended consequences, which is not surpris-
ing, given the different structure of the eurozone economies
compared to those of the WCA countries. For example,
between 2002 and 2005, the world price of cotton increased
by 20 percent in US$ terms (from US$1.02/kg to
US$1.22/kg) while it declined by 9 percent in CFAf terms
(from CFAf 711/kg to CFAf 644/kg). Within the current
political and macroeconomic setting, it is beyond the control
of individual WCA governments to choose the exchange rate
regime that is consistent with the structure of their
economies. That makes the case for reforms even stronger.
Only Limited Reform Efforts
Faced with those constraints, a number of WCA coun-
tries began reassessing the structure of their cotton indus-
tries. With financial and technical assistance from the donor
community, especially the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, policy reforms were contemplated during
the early 1990s to bring the cotton sector back to a sustain-
able development path and, ultimately, increase the welfare
of the cotton growers. 
However, because the reforms were portrayed as ideo-
logically driven—that is, forced by the Bretton Woods
Institutions—they were viewed with suspicion. Not surpris-
ingly, they were subjected to considerable opposition from
the WCA countries themselves as well as from bilateral
donors.9 For example, in a survey of the cotton sectors of
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin, Professor Yves Bourdet from
the Lund University in Sweden described the reasons for
such opposition as follows: 
There are two reasons behind this limited ownership
[of reforms by] home government. The first is the
strong opposition on a part of the urban elite and
some farmer associations in cotton-producing coun-
tries to the privatization of the state-owned ginning
enterprises, which are at the centre of the network of
institutions and actors composing the cotton sector.
The second is the opposition of some bilateral
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donors, in particular France as the main bilateral
donor, to the deregulation of the sector. No doubt
this “lack of enthusiasm” on the part of the home
government of cotton-producing countries and some
bilateral donors has contributed to the slow pace and
mixed outcome of reforms.10
Following the cotton price collapse of the late-1990s,
however, it became evident that reforming the cotton indus-
tries by eliminating the monopoly status of the cotton com-
panies and introducing competition is probably the only fea-
sible alternative. Yet, despite that understanding and “con-
structive dialogue,” policymakers have been reluctant to
engage in serious reform efforts and hence the structure of
the WCA cotton sectors is not very different from what it
was 30 or 40 years ago. In Chad, for example, reforms are
nonexistent. Although the government of Chad announced
that it would disengage from the cotton sector in 1999, so far
it has failed to act accordingly (with the single exception of
the privatization of the company that makes cotton oil—one
of the by-products of processing of the cotton seed). Factors
behind the unwillingness to reform include fiscal difficulties
of the cotton company, the lack of ownership of reform by
the government and, more recently, the windfall revenue
from crude oil that has practically absorbed all capacity and
energy by officials who, otherwise, would have been in
charge of the reform process.
Reforms in Benin consisted of three key elements: sepa-
ration of the various links in the cotton supply chain accord-
ing to the different functions—such as input provision, seed
cotton production, transport, ginning, and trading; division of
the responsibility for handling those functions—except for
research and training—among a large number of actors; and
organization of the key decisionmaking process (including
issues such as the price setting mechanism and cotton deliv-
ery time) into horizontally organized entities, which must all
agree before any sector-wide decision is made. Despite
those, albeit limited, reform efforts, it appears that the per-
formance of the sector has not improved. For example, there
was a sharp decline in cotton production from 171,000 tons
of cotton fiber in 2004–05 to 82,000 tons in 2005–06.
Some reforms took place in Burkina Faso when the gov-
ernment sold part of the state-owned monopoly to private
investors. The market is currently structured into three region-
al monopsonies—a dominant state-owned company account-
ing for about 85 percent of cotton purchases and two private
companies that account for the rest. On the positive side, it
should be noted that Burkina Faso is the only country in sub-
Saharan Africa (in addition to South Africa), which is in the
process of introducing GM cotton. However, the drying up of
the cotton stabilization fund and the recently revealed €100
million debt by the dominant state-owned company, calls into
question the sector’s long-term sustainability.
Mali, which has contemplated reforms for quite some
time, reconsidered its reform commitment in July 2004 and
decided to start assessing the pros and cons of the reform
process in Burkina Faso and Benin instead. In November
2005 the government increased its share in the capital of the
cotton company (from 60 to 70 percent) and publicly
announced that reforms will be delayed for several years.
The Way Forward
Admittedly, the global cotton market reflects, in part,
rich countries’ protectionism. Nevertheless, policymakers in
the WCA countries (as well in other poor cotton-dependent
countries) face a number of challenges.
Reform programs for restructuring the cotton sector to
increase its efficiency remain largely incomplete. Reforms
should become the immediate focus of policymakers. After
all, even if cotton prices increase either as a result of elimi-
nation of subsidies or as a result of market forces, it will do
no good to poor producers if such an increase is absorbed by
bankrupt parastatals, debt-ridden cooperatives, or corrupt
public officials unwilling to engage in serious reform efforts.
Moreover, cotton producers face competition from chemi-
cal fibers, especially since technological improvements of the
early 1970s brought the prices of chemical fibers down to cot-
ton price levels. In an era of globalization and intense compe-
tition, cotton producers in many developing countries may
want to explore genetically modified seed technology in order
to compete more effectively with their competitors who have
already embraced such technologies. That, however, would
entail extensive field trials to develop varieties suitable to local
growing conditions as well as putting into place the appropri-
ate legal and regulatory framework—both of which are chal-
lenging and time consuming processes.
It has often been argued that poor cotton-producing
countries should engage in domestic value addition, specifi-
cally, textiles and clothing. While a successful textile indus-
try is good to have, especially when it comes to employment
generation, it is unlikely to improve the welfare of the cotton
growers for a number of reasons. First, regardless of whether
cotton is consumed domestically or exported, cotton growers
will receive the same price that is determined by global sup-
ply and demand for cotton. Second, the argument that local
cotton will be favored because domestically produced cotton
does not incur transport costs may not be valid since produc-
ing textiles for export markets implies that other types of cot-
ton and chemical fibers must be imported, thus subjecting
the industry to the same bottlenecks that the cotton industry
currently faces (i.e., high domestic transportation costs,
delays at the ports, etc.). Third, producing textiles for local
consumption may also not be profitable, given the prolifera-
tion of imports of second-hand clothing.
It is in the interests of the consumers in the rich coun-
tries and growers of cotton in West Africa that American and
European cotton subsidies should end. However, the positive
impact of the end of cotton subsidies on the welfare of West
African cotton farmers will be limited unless it is accompa-
nied by domestic reforms that should include privatization of
the state-owned cotton companies and liberalization of the
cotton trade.
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